

4 June 1984

NOTE FOR: D/ICS

SUBJECT: Unclassified Statement on US Collection Capabilities

The attached memorandum to Commodore Reynolds provides a revised unclassified statement on US collection capabilities for arms verification. Preparation of such a statement is in response to a Congressional request.

In our view, this statement is consistent with the 1978 NSC guidelines on disclosure of the "fact of" photo satellite reconnaissance. Consequently, we do not believe it requires DDCI approval. Nevertheless, we suggest he be provided an information copy.

Essentially this statement qualifies the theme presented in 1978 that national technical means provide a high degree of confidence in monitoring treaty compliance by pointing out that they are not infallible and that the USG cannot rely solely on them to detect treaty violations.

STAT

Chairman

Attachment: a/s

*The deadline in the DIA Request is not relevant.
We did not receive the request until after 16 May
& have kept the POC informed of our status.*

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Director

Intelligence Community Staff

Washington, D.C. 20505

DCI/ICS-84-4560

6 June 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Collection Management
Defense Intelligence Agency


SUBJECT: Unclassified Statement on US Collection Capabilities ☐ 25X1

REFERENCE: DIA Memorandum U-31, 081/DC-3A, 11 May 1984; Subject:
Review of Unclassified Statement.

1. The COMIREX Staff has reviewed and revised the proposed unclassified statement on US collection capabilities transmitted by the reference and prepared a response to a request from Congresswoman Johnson. This was done in collaboration with CIA's Arms Control Intelligence Staff and Collection Requirements and Evaluation Staff. The revised statement is attached (Attachment 1). ☐ 25X1

2. The COMIREX Staff conducted its review in the context of guidelines published by the National Security Council in October 1978 at the time President Carter made a public declaration of the fact of photo satellite reconnaissance as an element of national technical means of verification (Attachment 2). We believe any new statement pertaining to US verification capabilities such as the one proposed must still conform to these guidelines (Attachment 3). In our view the attached statement is in conformance. ☐ 25X1

3. We recommend that prior to release of the subject statement, coordination be sought from ☐ Chief of DIA DI-5, International Negotiations Division, and that final concurrence and approval be obtained from an appropriate member of the NSC Staff. Release should then be accomplished through OSD Public Affairs. ☐ 25X1



25X1

Attachments (3)
As Stated

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

OCTOBER 1, 1978

Office of the White House Press Secretary
(Cape Canaveral, Florida)

THE WHITE HOUSE

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT
AT
CONGRESSIONAL SPACE MEDALS AWARDS CEREMONY

Kennedy Space Center,
Shuttle Landing Facility

(4:14 P.M. EDT)

* * *

Weather satellites have already saved billions of dollars, thousands of lives through early warnings of hurricanes and floods. We will continue to develop them. We have greatly strengthened our national security through defense space applications. We will continue to develop these capabilities.

Photo reconnaissance satellites have become an important stabilizing factor in world affairs in the monitoring of arms control agreements. They make an immense contribution to the security of all nations. We shall continue to develop them.

Earth resources satellites have already proved their value to many countries through remote sensing. They tell us about everything from the location of mineral and energy deposits to the condition of our crops, from the motion of icebergs to the health of the oceans.

We will continue to develop and to use these satellites for the benefit of all people of the world.

Aboard the shuttle on many of its missions will be the European-built laboratory, the space lab. Scientists of many nations will use the space lab to do research in all branches of science and engineering. No one can say where this research will lead, but carefully selected experiments could yield direct benefits in the coming decades.

MORE

COMIREX 2.2/22

Attachment

Tab B

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78-9423/5

MC's 2 Oct.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONCONFIDENTIAL--XGDS (2)


September 29, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
AND BUDGET
DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT AGENCY
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS
AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY POLICY

SUBJECT: Guidance on Public Queries Related to
Declassification of the "Fact of"
Photoreconnaissance Satellites

The attached reflects the Administration policy regarding public queries to be observed by all Departments and Agencies commencing October 2, 1978. All public queries are to be referred to the Office of the Secretary of Defense/Public Affairs at this time for response.



Zbigniew Brzezinski

Enclosure
Press Guidance

CONFIDENTIAL--XGDS (2)

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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (2)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON 2 Oct 78

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Attachment

Tab B

Press Guidance on Questions Related to President's Statement
on U.S. Satellite Photoreconnaissance

Comments shall not go beyond the President's direction to acknowledge that the U.S. conducts satellite photoreconnaissance including acknowledgement that photoreconnaissance is one of the NTMS used to verify compliance with SALT and other arms control agreements. In particular, spokesmen are not to comment on any questions relating to: (1) the capabilities of these systems; (2) their operation; (3) comparison to other U.S. or foreign reconnaissance systems; (4) uses of photoreconnaissance satellites other than the "generic" fact and/or support of arms control agreements; (5) other types of classified satellites; (6) specific form and dissemination of information obtained by photosatellites; (7) uses of such information other than for "national security requirements" and/or verification of arms control agreements; (8) any other aspect of overhead reconnaissance.

To foster uniformity and best protect security, the only office to respond to inquiries from the public at this time concerning "fact of" and "facts about" photoreconnaissance activities of the U.S. will be the Office of the Secretary of Defense. All queries will be referred to OSD/PA.

Questions and authorized answers are attached. Unless a question can be answered by reference to the President's statement, this guidance, or the attached Q's and A's, OSD spokesmen shall clear all other responses to queries with the National Security Council.

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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5E (2)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON INDEFINITE

CONFIDENTIAL--XGDS (2)

COMIREX- 11/22

Attachment

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q. How good is the quality of the pictures our satellites take?

A. Very good. I cannot go into specific detail regarding the capabilities of these systems.

Q. How often do we photograph a given area?

A. Photoreconnaissance coverage is contingent on national security requirements and requirements to verify compliance with arms control agreements. I cannot discuss the specific operational characteristics of our photoreconnaissance systems.

Q. What do we photograph from satellites?

A. We use photoreconnaissance satellites to monitor certain activities that are relevant to compliance with arms control agreements and other national security requirements.

Q. Do we take satellite photographs of other countries besides the Soviet Union?

A. We use photoreconnaissance satellites to monitor certain activities that are relevant to compliance with arms control agreements and other national security requirements.

Q. Do we ever photograph the U.S. from space?

A. Yes. Periodically, we operate these systems over the U.S. in a manner that preserves and respects established concepts of privacy and civil liberties.

Q. Who operates the satellites we use to verify arms control agreements?

A. Those satellites are operated by the Department of Defense at the direction of the President and the National Security Council. I cannot comment on details of operational control.

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EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION

SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652

EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B(2)AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON 2 Oct 78

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Attachment

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Q. Who sees the results?

A. The results of satellite photoreconnaissance are available to appropriate analysts and policymakers in the Executive and Legislative Branches.

Q. Have we ever shown photographs taken by these satellites to the Soviets?

A. No.

Q. Do we show these satellite photographs to our Allies?

A. We share information with our Allies.

Q. Does the Soviet Union also use satellite photography?

A. Yes.

Q. How can we be sure that the Soviets won't destroy our satellites?

A. The SALT ONE agreements and the draft SALT TWO treaty specifically prohibit Soviet interference with U.S. national technical means of verification which include photoreconnaissance satellites. In addition, we are currently engaged in discussions with the Soviets aimed at limiting anti-satellite capabilities. The White House statement on space policy issued last June reaffirms that an attack on a U.S. satellite would clearly be a hostile act.

Q. Is it legal to take pictures from outer space?

A. Yes, the use of photoreconnaissance satellites is consistent with the Outer Space Treaty of 1977 and is not precluded by any principle of international law. The SALT ONE agreements specifically provide that national technical means will be used for verification of compliance with the agreements. The draft SALT TWO agreement nearing completion also refers to the use of such means of verification.

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COMIREX 1/22

CONFIDENTIAL--XGDS (2)

Attachment

Tab B

Q. Do we use photographic satellites to spy on other countries?

A. Photoreconnaissance satellites help us to verify compliance with the terms of arms control agreements.

Q. Does the phrase "national technical means" refer to other devices besides photoreconnaissance satellites?

A. Yes. Verification of different arms control agreements necessarily involves various types of technology. For instance, a seismic detection system would be the principal means of verifying compliance with agreements that limit underground nuclear testing.

Q. Is the use of photographic satellites to verify SALT agreements something new? If you were reluctant to talk about those satellites before, why are you doing so now?

A. The President's explicit reference is the result of a number of considerations. First, it is related to a reassessment of our security classification procedures, in order to make as much information available as possible without jeopardizing national security. Second, it is part of a general review of our national space program. By referring to our use of photoreconnaissance satellites, we want to make clear to the public that verification of SALT agreements is based on our own technical capabilities and does not depend on Soviet good faith or assurances.

Q. I understand that the President decided last spring that the fact that the U.S. conducts satellite photoreconnaissance should remain classified. Is that true? If so, why did the President change his mind?

A. Many aspects of our space policy have been under continuing review since the White House announcement of this policy made last June. As I said before, one factor that led to the President's statement was our desire to promote public understanding of our ability to verify a new SALT agreement and arms control agreements generally.

Q. How is the President's statement related to the Kampiles incident?

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CONFIDENTIAL--XGDS (2)

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Attachment
Tab B

- A. The Kampiles case is presently in litigation and therefore any comments relating to the case are inappropriate.
- Q. Will the reported loss of a manual describing one of our satellites damage our ability to conduct photo-reconnaissance from space?
- A. The Kampiles case is presently in litigation and therefore any comments relating to the case are inappropriate.
- Q. Since the Soviets reportedly know how good the capabilities of our photographic satellites are, why don't you release some sample pictures so that the American public can know too?
- A. For a number of reasons I must emphasize that both the photographs and analyses based on them remain classified however are available to the President, his senior advisers, and to the Congress.

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

11 MAY 1984

U-31,081/DC-3A

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON IMAGERY REQUIREMENTS AND
EXPLOITATION

SUBJECT: Review of Unclassified Statement

Reference: Congressional Tasking (enclosure 1).

1. DIA was tasked to develop a response to a Congressional inquiry and coordinate it within the Intelligence Community. Per conversation between the DIA and IC Staff Congressional Liaison offices, you were identified as the IC Staff POC on this matter. If the proposed response (enclosure 2) is acceptable to the IC Staff, request your concurrence. If there are security sensitivities not adequately considered in this proposal, your recommendations for specific changes would be most helpful.

STAT

2. This response is also being coordinated with CIA and NSA.

3. We would appreciate your comments by ^{extended} 16 May 1984. [redacted]
[redacted] is the DIA POC on this matter.

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FOR THE DIRECTOR:

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2 Enclosures a/s

[redacted]
Assistant Deputy Director
for Collection/Management

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1. Following a presentation of the Soviet Military Trends and Capabilities Briefing by [redacted] to a group of approximately 60 members of the House of Representatives on 27 March 1984, Representative Nancy Johnson (R CT) asked several questions concerning the extent and frequency of U.S. satellite reconnaissance coverage of the Soviet Union and the ensuing U.S. analytical problems. Representative Johnson then stated that numerous constituents in her district alledge that, because of omnipresent, detailed U.S. satellite collection, U.S. Intelligence is omniscient, and the U.S. should therefore be free to enter into virtually any arms control agreement with the Soviets. She requested that DIA provide an unclassified statement on U.S. collection capability and the actual situation--that U.S. Intelligence has imperfect knowledge of the Soviet Union--for her to use when speaking to these constituents.

2. Develop a statement as requested by Representative Johnson, coordinating with other Intelligence Community agencies as necessary. Statement should not be addressed to Representative Johnson; once developed, it should be equally useful and available to other members of Congress. After statement is coordinated within the Intelligence Community by DC, DI-3 will obtain clearance from OSD/Public Affairs Security Review.

Encl 1 to

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